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THE PLACE OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
REFLECTIONS ON PRESENT AND FUTURE ASPECTS
A. Lebeau Iand H 9, Reuter 2
It was not economic forces, and still less those aspects of the /1
market forces which are rational and accessible to quantitative
analysis, which originally determined the development of space capa-
oity, any more, in fact, than they determined the orientation of the
first projects. How else can we understand the enormous deployment
of efforts directed towards a single objective, the conquest of the
Moon, an objective which everyont understood to offer no economic
interest, and moreover n4 military interests within a reasonable time
span, while the scientific returns were not sufficient to justify
this choice. Perhaps it was the embarrassment generated in certain
of the people responsible by the seemingly gratuitous nature of this
enterprise which gave rise to the attempts, commoii during the 1960's,
to justify the space program by its "repercussions that is, by its
indirect benefits. This question of indirect benefits is now the
subject of serious study, but what occupied its place at the time of
the Apollo project was distressingly simplistic, justifying the
development of Saturn V by the improvements induced in household
appliances, and resolutely ignoring the cost of opportunity. Our
intention here is not to analyze the forces which gave rise to the /2
space effort; others have tried their hand at this fascinating under-
taking (I). More modestly, we are going to examine the significance
of the development which took shape, towards the mid 1960's, with the
appearance of applications satellites, and which, in a single decade,
has completely transformed the dynamism of the space effort.
The appearance of economic applications for space activity
initially took the form of a by-product, not a basic objective of the
early phase of development. We must not forget, for example, that,
lProfessor, Conservatoire National des Arts et M6tiers, Chair of
Technology and Space Programs.
Head, Department o:: General Programming, European Space Agency
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in 1964, on the occasion of the presentation of the SYNCOM-2 project
to the International Radioscience Union, we were still very seriously
questioning the viability of geostati.onary communications satellite
technology, a dead end in technological evolution to some, the
emergence of an essential phylum for others.
The rapid growth in space applications wid the profound changes
in the general economic context in which these applications are
developing has brought about a reversal of this situation. Today, we
are no longer attempting to redirect, to economic ends, a movement
which obtains its energy from other sourcesi it is the economic
objectives which provide the prina3pal driving force behind the space
effort. It is therefore essential to assess correctly their nature
and scope. This calls, first, for a summary of the present situationR
and then for an analysis of the probable evolution of space activities
over the coming decades. In addition, reflections on more distant
horizons and on the limits of space development provide an indispen--
sible background.
The Present Uses of Space	 /9
In the field of space, as elsewhere, there is a close relation-
ship between technological achievement and available applications,
But the space field has a special aspect in that a very significant
gap is establishing itself between "available" technology and "utili-
zed" technology. The high per unit cost of space projects and, no
doubt, the general and irreversible nature of failure contributes to
the extent of this gap.
To illustrate this hypothesis, we might consider, for example,
the following aspects=
the achievement of man's presence in Space has been the object
of.-development efforts, on the part of the two great space
powers, which represent a very substantial fraction of their
total space ei'fort and yet no significant application has, so
f
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far, been constructed on the achievement of this technology,
similarly, applications of recovery technology, which has been
completely mastered at the present time, are strictly the pre-
serve of the military.
But, in more general, terms, we see that 'the technologies used
for application purposes form a relatively small sub-group of the
technologies which have been developed and implemented for scientific,
military or prestige projectst to this sub-group we can add certain f4
specific applications developments. This situation is in no way
surprisingi it results from the origins of space applications and the
effect of the prevailing forces which provided the impetus for the
space effort from the beginning.
The basic tools in applications are still; the consumable
launcher and the automated satellite, placed in orbit once and for .
all and inaccessible to further physical intervention. The geosta-
tionary satellite is a special case whose importance is well known.
The present applications of space technology involve only the
collection and transmission of information. Applications in tele-
communications, meteorology, observation of the Earth for civilian or
military purposes, or navigation, are all essentially information
transactions. This observation allows us to situate the importance
of current space applications in the general picture, while at the
same time it reveals the unity underlying the apparent diversity of
the particular applications. The satellite is a relay which receives
information and retransmits it to one or more ground stations.
Simplifying to extremes, we can distinguish two cases
- the signal which reaches the satellite's receivers is of natural.
origin= thus it providers the community with information on its
environment and allows it to determine its behavior as a function
of that environment= meteorology and long-range observation
satellites belong to this category.
t
- the signal which is relayed is of human origin, and thus pre- 13
vides information on the community's own activitiest in the first
rank of this category come the telecommunications and television
relay satellites.
The volume of information, transactions measures the degree of
development of a society, probabl y in a manlier more profound and dur-
able than does the volume of energy transactions. The growth of
information transactions is a basic aspect of technological and
economic development. It gives concrete expression to two aspects
- the increase in data processing operations,
the increase in information transfer operations= the development
of telecommunications.
These two phenomena, whose magnitude is well known, are two
aspects of the same development. It is the second aspect which
determines the intrinsic importance of current space aprlications.
This present and future importance results from the interplay of two
factorss the growth in telecommunications, and the role of space
technology in this increases
- in the case of the first factor, it will be recognized first of
all that, while it is easy to see the physical limitations of the
increase in energy transactions, those which might affect the
increase in information transactions are infinitely more distant
and more difficult to pin down. To the extent that information
transfers involve automated systems# it is also impossible to /6
base any estimate of a saturation of demand on the limited
capacity of the hurrran brain. In concrete terms, nothing indi-
cates that the increa-e in telecommunications which characteri-
zes the present era must come to a halt in the foreseeable future.
- in the case of the second factor, how can we estimate the share
of space technologies in this phenomenon of growth in telecom-
4
munications. In fact there exists only two methods for trans-
mitting an electromagnetic signal, which is the normal informa-
tion vehicle, between two distant points on a spherical earths
physical guidance on the ground using cables, hertz1an beams or
optical fibers, and the satellite, which makes it possible to
establish a relay simultaneously visible from those two points
(2). Sixteen years after the launching of the first geostation-
ary satellite, SYNCOM-2, in 1964, the balance between these two
technologies, which are both developing rapidly, has not been
reached, and is not easy No foresee.
The profile of growth in the number of intercontinental circuits
in the INTELSAT system, for example, does not measure just the increas-
ing demand, but the effect of the appearance of a new technology
removing the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the satisfaction
of these demands.
Estimation of the market available to space telecommunications is
presently the object of general interest on +he part of government
officials and industrial circles and the skepticism which used to be
the rule has long since given way to infatuation.
Communications satellites were recognized quite early, in the	 /7
United States as well as in Europe, as the most important element of
applications programs. This is a particularly remarkable example of
rapid evolution from the stage of research to that of commercialization.
It took less than a decade to pass from the first demonstration
satellite to the creation of an international organization, INTELSAT,
implementing a commercial system. Today, in addition to the INTELSAT
system, there are numerous "domestic" satellite telecommunications
systems at the national level, and INTELSAT also leases transponders
to more than 20 countries for their domestic user reducing the cost
of access to the use of space technologies for these countries and
creating conditions for future growth in satellite telecommunications
(3).
5
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	 Figure i shows an overall picture of all the telecommunications
satellites launched in non-Communist countries. It demonstrates, on
the one hand, extraordinary growth, and on the other, the dominant
Position of American manufacturers, The origin of this preponderant
role of American industry is shown in Figure 2 which summarises the
public financing of the development of telecommunications satellites
by NASA on the one hand, and by the member states of the European
apace Agency (ESA) on the other. Europe launched its development
effort ten years later than did the United States= the effects of this
delay are still perceptible, and it is only recently that the European
	
`	 industry was in a position to claim to compete with American industry.
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Figure 2t Expenditures for -the Development of
Telecommunications Satellites (Excluding
Launching Costs= Current Prices
All forecasts indicate that the rapid growth in telecommunications /8
satellites will continue at an unchanged rate during the coming decade,
In the United States, in particular, a considerable effort is engaged
in studies to try to establish a projection of the demand for both
fixed and mobile telecommunications systems. These studies suggest
that in 2,000 A.D. world demand will call for 179 satellites in geo-
stationary orbit, placed in service by 67 different international,
8
ii
regional and national organizations (4). This growth in demand will
saturate frequency allocations in the C and K bands and require the
use of the 20-30 GHz band for high capacity sections. Effort in
research and development will be called tor, not only for the implc
mentati.on of 20-30 GHz systemic but also to Improve efficiency in the
use of the precious C and K bands.
Mobile service telecommunications are also undergoing rapid
growth. In the United States, the demand for mobile telephone service
far exceeds capacity in many urban areas, even though the cost of this
service is high, its quality variable, its range limited and although
it suffers, in addition '
 from a lack of coordination among suppliers
(5).
The enormous potential demand for improved mobile telephone
service has been recognized by AT&T which has begun testing a "cellu-
lar" system in Chicago. This system reduces costs and provides a
remedy for the limitw g ins of quality and capacity of the existing
systems. "Cellular',
 system, will be installed in urban areas and
along the major road axes.
Once these have been installed, they will serve 80% of the
population of the United States but only 10% of the surface area of
the country. It does not seem likely that it would be profitable to /9
extend the system to serve the rest of the population. A satellite
system, integrated with the ground system, could then be devel.opo-d to
serve the entire country.
NASA is currently carrying out studies in two areas, fixed
service telecommunications at 20-30 GHz and mobile service telecom-
munications at 800 MHz (6). The basic objective of these studies is
to identify technological priorities and establish market projections.
It is the 20-30 GHz sector which ourrently has the highest priority
and two important market projection studies were recently completed
by I.T.T. and Western Union (7 9 8). In the mobile service sector,
studies on systems design and cost- return studies based on numerous
9
i
	 case studies have been carried out. They provide significant results
{
	
	
in the area of emergency medical services (9) and police (19) and
other public services such as forest fire control. These studies as
a ,group indicate t'"ki tt both social and economic benefits are to be
anticipated from the development of mobile i'Pommun,catons via satellite.
For its part, the ESA has launched a comparable effort by Intro-
ducing Europe's special characteristics into an analysis of world
trends (11), The first results of this uncompleted study indicate
growth trends analogous to those which emerge in American studies. /10
From all this the overall impression is that after the develop-
ment already accomplished in intercontinental telecommunications, the
market for fixed and mobile domestic telecommunications and for
televised information justify the competition which is forming, and
that these two sectors will, in the coming years, constitute an
essential driving force behind space activities. But beyond all the
specific analysess generally positive in their findings, which can be
carried out on the profitability of a given segment of the space
Industry, the stake in present space applications must be assessed as
one aspect of an overall process of development which transcends
economic categories and administrative structures. With data process-
i:ng and ground telecommunications, they are a tool of a fundamental
aspect of development, the growth in information transactions. From
this comes the emotional significance of achievement% beyond the
economic stake, a political stake.
Moreover, the economic impact of the development of space
activities exceeds the result provided by analysis of the economic
and commercial significance of the various applications sectors.
There are indirect benefits which extend to other areas of industrial
activity; these are the famous "repercussions" on which the initial,
rather naive efforts at identification of the 1960's had cast a degree
of discredit These indirect benefits result from technological
innovations, development of new products and improvements in techno-
logical and organizational methods.
10
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	 NASA carried out an in-depth study on this subject starti..e in
1971r a study which predicted a return at the rate of 7 to 1 by t987
on expenditures committed between 19$9 and 1969 (12). A later study,
in 197, led to a forecast of an 8 to 1 return (13). These studies /f1
used macroeconomic models which give results at a very low level of
reliability. The BSA has, moreover # obtained, on the basis of studies
described in an article in the present publication { ............. ..
Pt	 ) a more modest result with a return at the rate of 2.7 to 1 in
the form of indirect benefits injected into the economy of member
states through its contracts. The BSA study was based on a micro-
'	 economic approach which leads to a greater degree of confidence in the
validity of its results.
Th2 Zvoluti n of Space Technolo
	
nd_T s Prob ble_ Effects
The extent of the area exploited by space technologies is far
from clearly def;inedf it corresponds to a stage In the evolution of
these technologies and there is every indication that, in this rats=
pect, we are on the threshold of profound changes.
The discrepancy between exploited and available or developing
technology provides a basis for a forecast of the development of the
field of exploitation. An examination of the huge development efforts
which are in progress worldwide indicates that, in fact, new capa-
cities have been achieved and that they will reach the exploitation
stager which, in turn, will naturally give rise to an increase in the
f field of appl' ,+at ions.
In all probability * we shall, as a result, commit an error of
the first order in considering space technology as stagnant in terms
of our decade and in basing an economic or industrial strategy on this
hypothesis.
The orbital systems in service are limited in their design by /12
the constraints imposed by current launching methods, The first of
these constraints is the impossibility, or near impossibility, of
11
acting on the system once in orbits orbital systems are therefore not
subject to repair and its is noti passible to renew their supply of
consumable elements, stabilization ergols for example. As a result,
just like living beings, they have a limited life span, of around
seven years for present-day systems. Th-is life span is a random
quantity whose upper limit is established by the exhaustion of the
satellite :, consumable resources. The need to maximize this life
span in order to maximize the profitability of the systems compels
us to seek a high degree of reliability, which is reflected in extreme
caution in the design and manufacture of orbital systems, in a tend-
ency to voluntarily limit their complexity and to avoid in them the
use of technology whose reliability has not been totally demonstrated.
The effects of this constraint are accent l4ated by the high cost of
launching. In the present state of technology the cost of placing a
kilogram in urbit is approximately 80 000 UC for a low circular polar
orbit adapted to ground observation, and about 33000 UC for a geo-
stationary orbit. The cost of launching thus weighs very heavily in
systeris economy.
Finally, the impossibility of assembly while in orbit limits the
size of satellites: it makes it necessary to adapt their mass to
existing launchers and their geometry to the dimensions of the nose
hulls.
These constraints as a group have led to the design of systems 113
which, in th6 great majority of cases, have a single function or
rather a group of functions relating to a single user and depending
on a single source of financial backing. The reduction in reliability,
and consequently of the probable life span, which inevitably accom-
panies increased complexity, and maintenance consisting of Total
replacement of a severely deteriorated system, both help to establish
this practice
In order to appreciate the development which we must anticipate
in the coming years, we can refer to the objectives of the develop-
ment effort which has been undertaken in the United States, because
12
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	 the dominant character of the American space effort ^,n fact imposfip,
its own pace on the development of space activities in he Western
world. This effort has, since the end of the Apollo program, been
concentrated on the development of a space transport system (STS).
This choice, of which the most important and best-known element is the
space shuttle, has brought about relative stagnation in the technology
j
	
	 of conventional launchers and, to a lesser degree, in that of orbital
systems. American industry and users have remained, as long as the
STS did not really exist, in a state of cautious expectation; nor, of
course, did they invest any major effort in new systems adapted to
conventional launchers which were destined to be abandoned. With the
implementation of the space shuttle in 1981, the federal financial
support which has been concentrated for the past few years on the
development of the actual launching aspects, should logically be
diverted on the one hand to related systems capable of increasing its
efficiency and flexibi,14ty in use, and on the other hand to orbital /14
systems adapted to the characteristics of the space shuttle.
What new capacities will be available, and what development in
exploitation activities can we anticipate?
the first innovation is certainly the possibility of acting on
systems in orbit to assemble them, supply them, repair them or
adapt them to changing needs;
the second is the possibility of "recovery", that is, the routine
return to Earth of heavy payloads;
- to this is added the prospect of a progressive drop in launching
costs.
These very simplified indications call for some comment. On the
one hand, uncertainty remains as to the performance of the STS in
terms of cost efficiency and, moreover, in any case these performances
will be achieved only gradually and on condition that there are com-
plementary developments. In addition, the capacity for acting on a
13
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satellite in orbit is associated, in the STS, with the presence of
man in space, though this is not, in the present state of things, a
link whose necessity has been demonstrated.
With these reservations, it is still true that the three capa-
cities just .identified are not only the STS development objectives
but general trends which are imposed on the entire development of
space capacity. The little we know of developments in the Soviet
Union tends to confirm this.
The exploitation of those new capacities will bring about
	 115
development on two frontso
firsto and this is probably the factor which will make itself
felt first, in the field of already exploited applications, the
design of orbital, systems will adapt through a process of
optimization to the new characteristics of the launching systems.
We must therefore anticipate progress in the direction of lsrge-
scale systems, assembled in orbit, with renewable supplies,
subject to repair and reconfiguration, and able to communicate
among themselves. This transformation will first affect the
satellites in low orbits and later extent to geostationary
orbits. Altogether this will be a real mutation in orbital
systems design which we must consider. One aspect of this
mutation w of capital importance in the economy of applications
will be the disappearance of current concepts of "lifespan" and
"maintenance by replacement", to be replaced by an idea of main-
tenance which is nearer to that practiced for ground systems.
The increase in the size of orbital systems rendered possible
by the relaxation of the reliability constraint and by the
possibility of assembly in space is another important aspect$ it
is accompanied by an increase in unku costs.
Overall, the problem of financing the development and mainten-
ance costs of these systems will be expressed in different terms.
14
_A
fhowever, the appearance of new applications becomes conceivable
with the emergence of new capacities.
'
	
	 The most immediately promising of these new sectors of activity /16
seems to be the explo tenon of the ,-hysical condition of weightless-
ness for the production of special materials of high cost per unit
mass, monocrystals and heavy organic molecules, for example. It
goes without saying that the dive l -r ,ient of this sector of activity is
strictly regulated by the achievvi%,t. , '1E of recovery technology and that
4
	
	
the extent of the profitable applications is controlled by the lowering
of orbital operating costs.
It is difficult to estimate the importance which, in the-more or
less distant future, the production in space of materials for ground
use might take. On the one hand a preliminary stage devoted to
research activities is necessary to assess the potential of weightless
operations. This is a completely new experimental situation whose
possibilities have to be explored. On the other hand, long-term
developments in orbital operations costs are
	
scarcely easy to anti-
cipate. It depends in fact on the viability of applications sectors
which can induce the development of new generations of launch systems
there is, for example, the question of electrical energy production
for ground use, an eventuality to which we will return in the context
of our discussion of long term prospects.
The rate and modalities of medium term development of the space
applications which have just been outlined can be assessed in various
ways but from the preceding discussion, the followings at least, can
be retained: provided there is no planetary upheaval which would
jeopardize development itself, the evolution observed in the develop
meat areas to which present space activities are linked leads us to /17
predict that their volume will increase, at least in terms of scale,
in the coming decades. This growth will be accompanied by technologi-
cal changes which are likely to open new fields of application and by
this very fact to accelerate the rate of growth. The combination of
these two factors, increase in volume and technological charges, spell
15
9failure to any long term strategy which does not take them into
accounts such a strategy is likely to invalidate the structures on
which, at the present time, the development of space activities restst
financing mechanisms, industrial structures, government and interna-
tional organizations and international agreements.
The Limits of Growth in S2ace Activities	 118
"2 no longer wish to swear that there is no possibility of
commerce one day between the Moon and the Earth.... Already we begin
to fly a littler.... la truths ours was not an eagle's flight,....
but what does it represent, as yet, but the first planks placed in the
water, which were the beginning of navigation. From those planks it
was a long way to the great ships which can journey around the world.
However, little by little the great ships came. The art of flying is
In its infancy; it will be perfected, ant one day we shall go to the
Moon."
FONTANELLE
Essays on the Plurality of
Worlds 1686.
The large-scale evolution which has begun in the structure of
space activities naturally leads to questions concerning the limits
of this growth.
It goes without saying that the methods of economic forecasting
which make it possible to estimate, with some degree of trustworthi-
ness, the rate of development of present day applications, and especi-
ally of telecommunications, are no longer suitable for the analysis
of more distant perspectives. It is, however, possible to construct
plausible scenarios for the coming half-century, and various authors
have attempted this.
We will not spend much time here on the detail of these scenarios
and we shall indicate only the nature of the mechanisms which could
act as a driving force in relaying information transaction needs.
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	 The first of these mechanisms, whose viability is still a matter
for speculation, is the intervention of space systems in the supply
of energy for ground use.
The idea of space stations collecting solar energy and retrans- /19
mtting it to Earth in the form of a beam of micro-wave energy was
first proposed by P ,iE. Glaser in the 1960's. Considered at the time
to be a fanciful notion, this idea held up under the efforts invested
in in-depth study so that the space energy station now seems a possi-
bility for a long-term solution to the Earth's energy supply problem.
Present circumstances are such that it is scarcely necessary to stress
the vital importance of this problem. The technological viability of
this space solution to the energy problem appears to have been demon-
strated. The economic feasibility of this solution is on the other
hand, an open question= and a difficult one to tackle because the cost
of space energy depends in fact on.hypotheses regarding the develop-
ment of launch systems, and because there is no general agreement on
the assessment of other definitive, or nearly definitive, solutions
(such as nuclear fusion and breeding). Whatever the case, the outcome
of this question is without any doubt a critical element in the future
development of space activities. This is, first, because the economics
of energy imposes its own dimension on space activities. But there
is more. The prospect of having to construct, in space close to Earth,
stations weighing several thousand toms and measuring several tens of
kilometers, would result in rethinking not only of the problem of
space transport systems, but that) of the source of materials. Why
collect these materials on Earth at the price of the energy expendi-
tures and pollution problems arising from the passage through the
atmospherr; and the earth's gravitational field, when the Moon is a
closer source in energy terms'
Next ,hy not assemble dangerously polluting or energy intensive
industries near space energy stations and supply them with material
from the Moon and the asteroids, with the finished materials being
brought back to Earth?
17
Finally, why not imagine that the industrialization of space and/20
the permanent presence there of man which would accompany this indus-
trialization, might lead to the colonization of space, that is, to a
process by which man would escape from the planet where life origi-
nated? All these prospects are the subject of studies which must
estimate both their tedhnalogical viability and the necessary stages
in their achievement. On this subject we must cite the well-known
studies of Professor O'Neill on the design of space colonies. The
overall conclusion is that it is impossible today to establish physi-
cal limits to the growth of space activities and that, on the contrary,
space technology is the tool which could make it possible to transcend
the physical limits to that growth. Whether or not this is a likely
proopect, we shall not venture to say.
These considerations do not have, or not yet, a significant
effect on the economics of space activities, but it was important to
bring them to light in order to place in perspective the present
stage in space development.
Space development was stimulated, as we have said,by forces com-
pletely foreign to the satisfaction of short term economic needs,
forces arising from idealism in which the search for knowledge played
a large part. These forces are always present but they are over-
shadowed today by economic and market forces. This substitution,
which makes possible the increase in space activities observed today,
is naturally accompanied by the allocation of priority to short-term
effectiveness and to the industrial competition which is an aspect of
this. There is no reason to revolt against this development. There
is however, reason to take care that this tendency to favor the
short-term, which is still further emphasized by the economic diffi-
culties of the present time, should be accompanied by sufficient
attention paid to potential objectives for the more distant future.
It seems important, for the health of the space enterprise, that it
does not lose sight of the distant horizons to which it owes its
birth.
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The question of Europe's place in the development of space
turally presents itself as a conclusion to these remarks.
In this area two observations impose themselves from the very
starts
- on the one hand, the level of public expenditures which Europe
has allocated to Space, whether at the national level or in the
context of the European space organizations, ESRO and ELUO and
ESA, is very low.
Figures 3 and 4 describe the total public expenditures by the
European countries for the period between 1968 and 1980 expressed both
in current monetary units and in constant monetary units normed at the
price levels of 1979. This last graph shows that the European space
effort has been maintained at a constant Level during the past decade.
It also shows that the European countries as a group have never
committed themselves to a major effort to bring their space capacity
up to the level of that of the United States or the Soviet Union.
Figure 5 is still more revealing, juxtaposing for the same period the
percentages of the gross national product (GNP) allocated by the USA
to NASA, by the member countries of the ESA to their national and
joint space activities, and by Japan to its national space organiza-
tion, the NASDA. This graph demonstrates that the United States, even
though the effort expended to put a man on the boon is a thing of the
past, are still prepared to spend a proportion of their GNP five or
ten times greater than comparable economic entities such as the
members of the ESA or Japan.
- on the other hand, it should be stressed that this effort, /22
limited though it may be, has led Europe to a .respectable series
of successes and to a relatively well- established position in
the achievement of space technology. The European countries
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have not only, developed and launched 60 satellites (see Figure
6), but also penetrated every field of space research and
applications. Here are some examples
in the scientific field, the European countries, with the
aid of a solid partnership with NASA and in some cases with
Tnteroosmos. have recorded major successes. The Helios,
COS-B and GEOS projects which study the sun, cosmic rays
and the magnetosphere have made a major and original oon-
tribution to our knowledge of the Universe. European
satellites will shortly set off for Jupiter and, above the
solar poles (ISPM).,will measure the position o y the stars
with a precision unknown until now (Hipparcos) or will keep
an appointment with Halley • s Comet (GIOTTO)i
in applications. European achievements are demonstrated in
the field of meteorology (METEOSAT ) and point to point
communications (O.T,S.). Further accomplishments will
shortly be seen in the field of mobile and maritime commu-
nications (MARECS)o direct television (TDF, TV SAT) and
long range observation (SPOT, ERS-1).
- Europe has made a commitment to manned flights in develop-
ing the first re-usable space laboratory, SPACELAB, an
integral part of the Space Transport System (STS) developed
by NASA. SPACELAB will provide European scientists with /23
opportunities for experiments in weightlessness.
finally, the ARIANE project gives Europe independent
launch capacity. This capacity should permit the European
industry 'to make a dent in the American monopoly of the
world market for launching and applications satellites.
The combination of these two aspects underlines an incontestable
success.
20
{	 While it is important to gauge the extent of thin suocessr it is
3
{	 even more important to assess its limits. Europe's competitive or
R	 quasi-competitive position does not arise only from the effort in-
vested, but also from its combination with a circumstantial aspect of
the development of American capacity, the period of relative stagna-
tion resulting from the development of the Space Shuttle. The European
advances cannot, therefore, be considered as having set up a stable
balances this will not be the case unless space technology is destined
for a lengthy period of stagnation and there is every indication that
this is not the case. Therefore, while it is legitimate and vital for
Europe to energetically exploit the capacity which it has, in such a
way as to consolidate its space industry, it is equally indispensable
for it to define a strategy for the future.
We will not seek to explain here the form which this strategy
might take, but we will try to pinpoint the elements which should
determine it.
In the field of applications, a technology which is second -rate,/24
either because of the limited service which it ,provides or by virtue
of its cost--effectiveness, cannot be maintained by artificial means
and disappears from the market. Within narrow limits, we can bring
into play preferential legislation for the domestic market but it is
well known that the limits of this procedure are quickly reached.
Taking this constraint into account, it is still important to recog-
nize that a development in exploited technologies brought about by the
American development effort is likely to cause gaps in the European
oapacitys
- gaps in the launch and in;-orbit intervention capacity which will
appear with the start-up of the STS and which will increase as
related systems are developed:
gaps relating to the technologies implemented in orbital systems
to exploit the new launch systemsr
21.
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Europe would thus ono* more find itself in a position it which
it would no longer have mastery,
 of all exploited technologies and in
which, as a result, its competit ive standing and industrial potential
would be at risk
This is the problem which must be met by the European strategy.
Drawing up such a strategy poses three main questions
what should be the relationship between the European and American
space ff fort?
- what development undertakings should replace the programs which
are responsible for the present situation?
on what degree of solidarity, and what type of cooperation, shall
the European countries base the structure of their spaoe effort?
It is all too clear that ther e must be a degree of coherence
among the choices relating to these three questions.
in the case of relations with the United States, the basic
choice is between maintaining independence and individuality of the
European space effort, in no way exclusive, moreover # of active co-
operation, and the acceptance of eventual dependence.
In the !case of the development effort necessary to maintain
European ambitions at their present Level, it is clear that it must
be based first and foremost on t1te upkeep of the European launch
capacity, or, in more general terms, of the European transport system,
A comment is required on this subject. The American space shuttle
Is an impressive, spectacular development. Europe would not be in a
position to duplricr,- e it within a decent interval. But nothing proves
that this is necessary. Nothing proves# in fact, that the Space	 f26
Shuttle is the optimum tool. The basic choices underlying the design
of the Shuttle, in particular the fact that the presence of a crew is
22
indispensible and that there is no automated mode, are not a 'Priori
incontrovertible choices. We shall see moreover, that the Soviet
Union, whose will to independence is not in question, is proceeding
down other paths. It is thus essential to examine, without precon-
ceptions and without being unduly influenced by American technological
choices, the question of how Europe can., on the basis of its achieve-
menu, maintain a competitive launch capacity, and which basic options
this calls for.
Finally, on the issue of the solidarity between European coun-
tries and the modalities of cooperation, obviously everying depends
on the ambitions the countries wish to assume and, as a result, their
awareness of what is at stake. The present stage is putting to the
test structures of cooperation which were designed at a stage where
market forces did not play the dominant role which they have today.
To adapt them to the exploitation oX an existing capacity is a task
whose urgency must not be allowed to obscure the seemingly obvious
fact that Europe's present position results from a common will and
from a solidarity which, white certainly flawed, have found expression
In all kinds of ways since the bQginning of the 1960's i in the future,
either there will be a common European will, whatever the structures
through which it is expressed, or, sooner or later, the European
countries will no longer have their own space capacity.
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1. Satellite 47.2. Country of origin 48.
Launoh. date 49•
Launoher 50.
5. Launch site 51.
6. Orbit (km) 52•
7. Weight (kg) 5408. Failed 5	 ,
9. Geostationary 55•
10. Geostationary 56.11. Solar 0.3 - 1 UA 57.
12. Geostationary 58•
13. Geostationary 569
14. Solar 0.3 _ 1 UA +
150 Geostationary
16. Failed 62.
i7. Geostationary 63.
18. Geostationary 64.
19. Geostationary 55
20. Mission 66 .
21. Ionospheres solar 67.
22. Aeronomy. radioastronomy 68.
69•23. Aeronomy, ionosphere
24. Nahnological 70.
25. Ionosphere, radio waves 71•
26 Geodesy
27. Dynamic geodesy 72•
28. Dynamic geodesy 73•
29. Ionosphere 74•
30. Aeronomy, Ionosphere 75*
76•31.
32.
X and cosmic rays
X and cosmic rays 77 ► 
Aeronomy, ionosphere 78•34 ,
3. Magnetosphere, solar
3S. Ionosphere. aeronomy
36 Magnetosphere, Earth-Sun
37. Military telecom.
38. Ionosphere
9. Military telecom.4 0. Eole prototype, geodesy
41. Cosmic hydrogen
42. Aeronomy
43. Meteorology, loc. of balloons
44. Technology
45. Aeronomy
46. Tonosphere
Magnetosphere
X, UV, sun rays
Solar cell trial
Magnetospheres ionosphere
Aeronomy, ionosphere
Aocelerooeter, engine
Military telecom.
Aeronomy
Technology
X. UV rays
Aeronomy # ionosphere
X rays
Ionosphere
Military telecom.
Solar, interplanetary
Experimental telecom.
Geodesy
Technology (accelerometer)
Technol. (hydrazine engine)
Cryogenic radiation trials
Cosmic rays
Experimental telecom.
Ultraviol..ot astronomy
Solar, interplanetary
Magnetosphere (partial
failure)
Gamma astronomy
Experimental tel.econ.
Magnetosphere
Experimental meteo.
Experimental, telecom.
Magnetosphere
Astro. X and cosmic rays
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Figure 6s Satellites Launched by the European Countries
Between 1962 and 1980
-•mi l	 ^1 Uito1'«^: ^U^t,,
I
(
1	 'iY'P,LLSTi: WAYSD OrUWtlt,
ISAI'1`
IR	 to*^x`I:^14"ti
i,'t. .....,
4 ^ t^R tx rx . t^r^Jr 1^,'t! (KC)
Mlh4loN
1...".
-
,.,
'
^
.	 ».
U1, 1 "Al l = 1" O.B. 16.04 . 1462 Drt.TA WkllL A 1'+lard 387/1 026 60 lonosph:lc, sulairu
U1: 2 "ARIEL 2" O.D.. 27,03,1964 SCOUT 14 ,11cli.1c1a^ 28011 349 75 A.1roAPM$0, radioactrnnumio 22
SAN MARCO 1 1 15.12.1964 SCOUT Wrllk§» 181.	 f 205/816 114 AdronumluI ionosphere	 23
A I "ASTVR1X" P ; 6.11.1965 n1AMANTA +1141	 ,v3uir 525/1 752 42 To4hholggiqua	 `F
rR I P 6.12.1965 SCOUT Vandcnberg 780/780 60 Tononphrro,igas radio 2 5
1)1 A"DIAPASON" P 17.02.1966 DIAMANT A n.milaaguir 503/2 727 19 G6od,leia
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UK 3 "ARIEL 3" C.B. 5.05,1967 SCOUT Vanuanbarg p485/595 90
r1
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NL 30.08.1974 SCOUT Vandenberg 357/1 170 136 Rayons X, UV	 5
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